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ABSTRACT 
Understanding how and why practices may be transformed is vital for any transition 
towards socio-environmental sustainability. However, theorising and explaining the 
role of individual agency in practice change continues to present challenges. In this 
paper we propose that theories of practice can be usefully combined with a 
psychosocial framework to explain how agency is biographically patterned and how this 
patterning is a product of attachment relationships and emergent strategies for dealing 
with uncertainty. Biographical interview data from the project Energy Biographies is 
used to illustrate the ways in which this theoretical approach can enhance 
understanding of how potential for practice change may be opened up or obstructed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In attempting to understand the factors that will be important in shaping any transition 
towards socio-environmental sustainability, policy makers have often employed 
theoretical models of social change that assume individuals can be treated as rational 
choosers of behaviours. It follows from such ABC (attitude-behaviour-choice) models 
(Shove, 2010) that to achieve pro-environmental transitions will require effective 
communication of information about the costs and benefits of different choices, so as to 
promote change in consumption behaviour. However, such models have been heavily 
criticised for their reductive framings of agency as rationally-chosen action, alont with 
their failure to acknowledge the ways that materials, meanings and knowledge 
dynamically interact in constituting particular forms of practice (Uzzell, 2008; Shove, 
2010). The sociological assumptions upon which they rest may thus be characterised as 
a questionable form of methodological individualism. 
Social psychologists have responded by attempting to integrate in multiple factor 
models various additional elements – including values, beliefs and social norms (Stern, 
2005). However, such approaches do not seek to understand the non-linear ways in 
which different elements, from technology and material infrastructure to broader 
societal values, can condition and produce each other in patterning (as contrasted with 
linearly causing) social change (Shove et al. 2012). Practice theory offers another 
approach, which is sociological rather than psychological in nature. It identifies 
practices as patterned and purposive shared activities that change over time (Shove and 
Pantzar 2005) and which help explain why individuals hold particular beliefs and 
values, but also why they act in particular ways (Shove et al. 2012; Hards, 2011).  
Shove et al. (2012) have produced a recent and influential account of practice theory, 
drawing on theoretical work by Reckwitz (2002) and Schatzki (1996) amongst others. 
In their account, practices comprise three elements which can change over time: 
competences, materials and meanings. They are reproduced with variations through 
time across performances by collections of individual actors. How exactly the agency of 
subjects is linked to practices, however, remains a complex question that requires 
further exploration. Shove et al.’s theory draws our attention to how practices ‘recruit’ 
and ‘retain’ the loyalty of individuals, and how collections of practices constitute 
distinctive environments (e.g. obesogenic, envirogenic) that pattern activity in 
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particular ways, and shape subjectivities accordingly (Shove 2010). It has, however, 
mainly done this by looking at how individual agency is shaped and constrained, over 
time, by the emergence of particular sets of practices. This form of practice theory 
therefore stresses that understanding change requires an understanding of the 
biographies of practices (Maller and Strengers, 2013).  
In this paper, we draw on selections from data generated as part of a social science 
research project, Energy Biographies, in arguing that social settings, as productive of 
inter-subjectivity, should be understood as including other elements that are not 
addressed concretely through practice theories. These other elements are attachments 
or investments which are a product of biographical experiences and which are, 
themselves, patterned in and across time (Finn and Henwood, 2009; Coltart and 
Henwood, 2012). The contribution of such relational elements to agency lies in how 
they affect the individual’s ontological security in the face of an intrinsically uncertain 
future (Giddens, 1991; Henwood and Pidgeon, 2013), by influencing how people make 
sense of the world around them either as reliable and trustworthy or as insecure and 
untrustworthy. These sense-making activities condition active agency, understood as 
individual and collective strategies for dealing with uncertainty. Following Marris 
(1996), we identify this emphasis on attachment and uncertainty as opening up a 
psycho-social route, distinct from practice theory though related to it, through which 
individual biographies may be linked to wider socio-cultural patterns of meaning and 
agency. 
Within our data, we identify ways in which recruitment to and defection from specific 
practices may be influenced by biographical patterns of attachment, and particularly 
changes or disruptions in the patterning of individual experiences, investments and 
subjectivities. Concepts of attachment and their constitutive value for identity (Yates 
and Day Sclater, 2000), we propose, should thus be considered as significant 
psychosocial analytical complements to practice theory, which allow us to understand 
how biographical experiences may hold wider significance for the ways in which people 
act in the world (Hollway et al. 2003; Hollway, 1989). Exploring such experiences may 
allow us to understand how, for example, some practices (including unsustainable ones) 
retain participants’ loyalty while others suffer defections. This is not to resurrect some 
form of methodological individualism, such as that which underlies the rational actor 
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model of subjectivity at the heart of the ABC approach. Instead, a psychosocial approach 
works with a concept of complex subjectivity and intersubjectivity that is inseparable 
from a dynamic condition of affectively and emotionally-patterned embodiment.  
 
2. THEORISING CHANGE: PRACTICE THEORY, TRANSFORMATIVE MOMENTS AND 
ATTACHMENT 
Practice theorists often conceptualise social change in terms of innovation in, 
recruitment to or defection from practices on the part of individuals (Shove et al. 2012; 
Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzski, 1996). These processes are related, in turn, to 
transformations in the elements that constitute practices (which Shove et al. condense 
into competences, meanings and materials). Such transformations may be dependent on 
wider social change in infrastructures, competences and/or meanings, or may arise as a 
result of the creativity of collections of performers. Both of these possibilities are 
explored by Shove et al., (2012) as ways of understanding changes in practices, in the 
values of individuals, and in which practices they participate. Other have suggested 
another avenue of investigation, one in which biographical transitions are identified as 
significant parts of the environment that shape changes in participation in practices and 
therefore in values (e.g. Hards, 2011; 2012; Butler et al. 2014a).  
For Hards (2011) this includes the proposition that practice theory contains the 
possibility of a dialogue between agent-focused and meso-level theories of social 
change. She attempts to promote such a dialogue with two concepts. First, the idea of 
communities of practice, a concept which originates with Lave and Wenger (1991), in 
which individually-transformative social interactions arise between participants 
involved in shared practices. Second, the idea of transformative moments – that is, 
epiphanic, emotionally-intense experiences which trigger, as part of initiation into or 
participation in communities of practice, shifts in practices and in values. The narrative 
interviews in Hards’ study of individuals engaged in pro-environmental lifestyles show, 
she suggests, that people interpret major changes in the practices in which they engage 
as resulting from such moments (2011, 2012).  
These moments are not represented by interviewees as brought about by new 
information or knowledge about the world. Instead, they are interpreted as rooted in 
long-standing beliefs in which individuals are intensely emotionally invested, or to 
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emotionally-intense experiences which expose deeper truths of some kind. They are 
therefore path-dependent to a significant degree, as they build on earlier biographical 
developments (Hards, 2012), and may be associated with performing specific practices; 
with particular lifecourse transitions; with certain sorts of contextual experience 
featuring particularly intense sensory or emotional components; and/or with particular 
kinds of interaction with others (2011: 37). Transformative moments are thus taken to 
be indicators of the existence of what Hards, following Shove’s usage, calls envirogenic 
contexts, i.e. ones that encourage particular kinds of pro-environmental engagement, 
but also point to the influence of patterns of individual experience and their effects on 
emotional commitments to particular competences or meanings.  
Narratives of lived experience may assist us in exploring the significance of 
transformative episodes for individuals, in which they defect from or come to engage in 
practices. But if we wish to explore this hypothesis, there remain the questions of how 
these episodes arise, to what patterning influences they are subject and to what extent 
these may fall outside practice theory’s conceptual framework. Why individuals engage 
in or defect from practices has been argued to be related to the internal rewards of 
engaging in them (Shove et al. 2012). Drawing on Alasdair MacIntyre’s (1981) work, 
they argue that performing a practice according to shared understandings of what it is 
to ‘do it well’ brings satisfaction and meaning. However, Hards’ analysis suggests that 
engaging in practices also bring another reward: they can be constitutive of identity and 
support valued forms of identity in the face of change.  
If biographical transitions reflect individual emotional experiences, then these 
experiences may be rooted in long-standing developmental patterns of psychological 
adjustment to social circumstances such as are explored in objects-relations theory, 
which deals with how the emergence and character of subjectivity depends on the 
dynamics of relationships that develop between the subject and its others throughout 
childhood and adolescence. It is true that the shaping of subjectivity as a process 
influenced by practices has, as noted above, been explored by practice theory. It has, for 
example, long recognised what Schatzki (1996, 93) calls ‘identity-bestowing 
understandings of action’. Part of practices, Schatzki suggests, are teleoaffective 
structures, which contain what are taken to be ‘correct or acceptable’ purposes, 
projects, ‘emotions, feelings, and passions’ (Schatzki 1996, 124). Shove, Pantzar and 
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Watson (2012, 23–4) note that the status of such future-oriented and future-disclosing 
structures is contentious within practice theory, and opt to identify them with ‘meaning’ 
more generally. Reckwitz is firm on this issue, however, asserting that ‘[w]ants and 
emotions … do not belong to individuals but – in the form of knowledge – to practices’ 
(Reckwitz 2002, 254). 
If teleoaffective structures, as future-oriented structures of feeling, mood and emotion 
with roots in the past, are at bottom elements of practices and not properties of 
individuals, however, then this does not account for another source of such structures: 
specific relationships in which individuals are heavily emotionally invested, and how, as 
a result of such relationships, individuals learn to handle social relationships more 
generally (whether emotionally significant or not). The concept of attachments – 
meanings rooted in biographical patterns of emotional connection – provides a way of 
thinking about how relationships contribute to knowledge, agency and identity. It can 
also assist us in understanding how individuals value (and engage in or defect from) 
practices.  
The internal rewards of practices (which practice theory conceptualises as inducing 
engagement or defection) may be thought of as related to how individuals – conceived, 
as in object-relations theory, as complex, always connected, relational subjects – find in 
these practices modes of being and doing that support their sense of who they are, but 
also of how they should ‘handle’ others to whom they are connected, or with whom they 
come into contact. Practices are not just structures, third-person explanatory variables; 
they matter to subjects (Sayer 2011) precisely because they help create expectations, 
produce feelings of autonomy by encouraging mastery of competences and reinforce 
connection with others through shared meanings. And the ways in which they play such 
roles in relation to an internally complex, psychosocial subject may help us understand 
how practices may change – a concern central to any desired transition towards socio-
environmental sustainability.  
 
3. ENERGY BIOGRAPHIES: RESEARCH METHODS AND APPROACH 
In the following sections, we draw on Energy Biographies data to explore how the roles 
played in the evolution of practices by forms of complex (inter)subjectivity such as 
those mapped in the previous section may be understood. Energy Biographies employs 
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repeat narrative interviews alongside multimodal methods to examine energy usage 
and sustainable practices more widely in the context of biographical transitions. This 
approach allows us to explore how attachment and strategies for dealing with it pattern 
participation in practices. Narrative elicitation enables interviewees to explore the 
affective and emotional content of biographical transitions, unlike more structured 
qualitative approaches. In addition, they allow researchers to explore the complex 
connections between transformative moments and the attachments that constitute the 
‘what matters’ (Sayer 2011) of individual lives. This gives the added advantage of 
encouraging interviewees to explore connections between values and practices in the 
light of present events, past changes and future possibilities (Henwood and Shirani, 
2012a). 
Across four diverse case site areas in the UK, interviews were conducted with 
individuals on three occasions over a one year period. In total, 74 people participated in 
first round interviews. A sub-sample of 36, selected for gender balance and to represent 
a range of demographic and socio-economic profiles, as well as different experiences of 
transition, took part in the two subsequent rounds of interviews, along with multimodal 
activities. In the analysis we draw on extracts from a small number of interviews to 
illustrate key points, but the overall argument, readings of theory and emergent 
conclusions are arrived at through an iterative process of engagement with data and 
theory informed by the dataset at a whole.  
Our analysis below identifies from the data four research topics connected to 
transformations in practice where a psychosocial approach to attachment may 
complement approaches set out by practice theorists, and develops key elements of a 
suitable conceptual framework alongside a reading of our data. These topics are: 1) 
what the rewards of participating in practices might be; 2) how attachment contributes 
to the temporal organisation of subjectivity; 3) how the disruption of practices may 
undermine attachments; and 4) how different styles of handling attachment produce 
active strategies for taming uncertainty. 
 
3.1. ‘We know it’s bad but we’re still going to use it’: relational rewards and the meaning of 
practice 
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Defection from or continuing to participate in practices, as Shove et al. (2012) point out, 
may be seen as conditioned by the meaning of practices in two ways. First, practices are, 
by definition, associated with goods or ‘rewards’ internal to them. Achieving these 
goods by engaging in the practice defines what it is to perform the practice well. Second, 
the meaning of practices is shaped by whether engaging in them reproduces shared 
symbolic distinctions (like good/bad, pure/impure) that are significant to the 
individual. These factors may explain why individuals go on from first encounters with a 
practice to become loyal participants (Shove, et al. 2012: 66–7, 74–75). In both cases, 
practices help to produce identity: they contribute to individuals’ sense of who they are 
within social settings, and what they can accomplish within them. They thus take on 
constitutive value (O’Neill, 1993) for the individual, as internal ingredients of identity. 
However, internal rewards and external linkages may not be entirely transparent to 
individuals. Some rewards may be experienced by the individual as a source of shame 
or guilt, or may be unavailable to the individual because his or her sense of identity 
and/or self-efficacy depends on denying particular motivations and/or desires.  
For example, beginning to participate in a practice such as bicycle commuting may, by 
providing new competences and encouraging emotional investment in the meanings 
associated with the practice (such as sustainability, efficiency, health and so on), bolster 
the individual’s sense of identity and self-efficacy. These rewards may both encourage 
recruitment to a practice and motivate continued participation. However, some rewards 
associated with the practice may be less acknowledged, perhaps because they are 
negative or defensive in nature. For example, commuting by bicycle may provide an 
outlet for aggression through ‘masculinized’ risk-taking urban cycling (Balkmar, 2009) 
and may re-inscribe, through such ways of performing the practice, social distinctions 
(subcultural in this case) between autonomous individuals (‘real’ cyclists who are able 
to cycle fast and confidently in traffic) and dependent ones (less confident bicycle users 
who may prefer to cycle on pavements) (Aldred, 2012).  
Loyalty to practices (such as to road cycling among cyclists who self-identify as 
autonomous) may lead to resistance to change (such as the creation of more dedicated 
cycling infrastructure) born of anxiety or fear at the potential destabilisation of the self 
(as perhaps manifested in campaigns among cyclists about losing the ‘right to the road’). 
Understanding recruitment to a practice may therefore require psychosocially 
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sensitised approaches, in order to investigate what phenomena such as defensiveness, 
evasion (Hoggett, 2013) or humour (Parkhill et al., 2011) within talk about practices 
may signify about subjective responses to change. Conversely, defection from practices 
may be a product of anger or disgust, a rejection of a certain image of the self or desire 
for another identity. Without being sensitised to such dimensions of participation in 
practices, it may be difficult to understand what secures individuals as participants, and 
how emotional investments may prevent or encourage participation, defection or 
indeed practice innovation.  
The meaning of attachments may therefore be seen as an element of the internal 
rewards of practices, but as simultaneously related to and different from the shared 
meanings of practices. They arise as part of biographical experiences of attachment 
relationships through which individual identity is formed. At the same time, they are 
inseparable from experiences of practices which do have shared meanings (such as the 
autonomy that may be identified with road cycling). But the individual’s connection to 
the practice is shaped by his or her own psychosocial biography, and his or her methods 
of handling attachment relationships with others and the vulnerabilities that arise from 
them. As we shall see in Section 3.4 below, these methods are not themselves strictly 
individual. They reflect more widely shared ‘structures of feeling’ (Hoggett and 
Thompson 2012) that produce collective strategies for dealing with uncertainty. 
Nonetheless, attachments should be treated as analytically distinct from practices in 
considering how practice participation becomes patterned over time. This point echoes 
arguments regarding the links between biography and shared meanings made 
elsewhere in psychosocial literature (e.g. Jefferson, 1996).  
We now turn to extracts from Energy Biographies interviews with Lucy to demonstrate 
how participation in particular practices is not simply about instrumental outcomes but 
relates centrally to attachments and rewards connected to these. When Lucy was first 
interviewed she had recently moved from London with her partner and young children 
to a house in an affluent commuter village on the outskirts of Cardiff. Lucy and her 
husband both had family roots in South Wales. This move to an area where they had 
family connections was bound up with the desire for an ideal home and for an enhanced 
quality of life. This entailed establishing a (re)new(ed) identity, centring on their new 
rural surroundings and the possibilities for hosting family and old friends from London 
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afforded by their new home. Where new energy-using practices emerge here they are 
associated with attachments that are integral to this identity-building process.  
As part of a photography task during the project, Lucy took pictures of patio heaters, 
which she recognised as ‘wasteful’ and ‘bad’ but also as vital, in a specific sense. Her 
sense of their wastefulness jars with her belief that, generally speaking, she runs an 
energy efficient household. Importantly, though, she downplays the wastefulness of 
‘heating the outdoors’ (Hitchings, 2007) because a particular vision of how one should 
enjoy rural life is important to her: 
we do love our patio heater when it’s a sunny evening but it gets a bit cold and 
dark and you can sit out and they’re like probably the worst things aren’t they? 
But we love it well we only use it about five times a year so it’s OK. 
 
Her description of why the practice of heating the outdoors matters to her derives from 
a shared meaning of the practice – i.e., the way in which it provides a degree of control 
over the uncertain British weather so as to maximise opportunities to enjoy being 
outside  (Hitchens, 2007). But the precise meaning of this added control, for Lucy, lies 
partly in the internal rewards of the practice, which derive in turn from how it 
contributes to her identity of the generous hostess in her new home, and also to the 
renewed meaning of her friendships: 
Cos we love being outside, we just love that you can you know go, we were 
sitting out there one evening … it was like midnight and you could have a drink 
outside still and it’s so lovely here cos it’s so quiet and everything so but you 
wouldn’t have been able to do it without that so or you would have been 
freezing. So that’s our kind of, we know it’s really bad but we’re still going to use 
it. 
The rewards of participation in practices are therefore not purely instrumental in the 
conventional sense (one engages in x to obtain or earn y). If participation is constitutive 
of continuing emotional investment, one of its payoffs is in constituting and confirming 
the identity of the individual ‘I am the type of individual who does x’. Such investments, 
and what happens to them, are ingredients of an individual’s evaluations of how s/he 
takes his/her life to be going (Sayer, 2011). They are the kind of goods which may be 
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taken to be a constitutive (rather than instrumental) part of human flourishing, and 
what happens to them affects whether a human life goes well or badly (O'Neill, 1993). 
To understand engagement in practices as part of lived experience, it is therefore 
necessary to understand, as Sayer (2011) argues, experience as structured by a concern 
both for oneself and one’s emotional investments. Lucy’s re-building of her sense of 
herself as hostess through participation in practices such as heating the outdoors 
confirms her wish that the family’s quality of life be enhanced as a result of their move. 
It is also symbolic of how, in this new context, she is able to sustain long-established and 
important attachments to friends as part of her readjusted identity. 
This example of Lucy’s participation in specific unsustainable energy-using practices 
underlines that to understand why people engage in practices means it is necessary to 
understand their relationality (Groenhout, 2004; Butler et al. 2014b). The meanings, 
competences and material of shared practices are one element of this relationality. But a 
biographical approach to practices underlines that attachment relationships and how 
they are constitutive of identity are still another element. What practices people engage 
in is influenced by how they evaluate things to be going for those things and people that 
matter to them. These evaluations in turn shape their view of what kind of person they 
are. Sense-making is closely bound up with practice, but also with emotional 
connectedness, a consideration that is as manifest in a desire for flexibility or 
disconnection as it is in a desire for solidarity or intimacy (Benjamin, 1990: 169–170). 
Practices have internal rewards, but some of these are relational rewards, payoffs 
shaped by the meaning of attachment relationships. 
From birth, object-relations theory suggests, experiences of attachment are ones 
through which anticipations and expectations of needs-satisfaction are created. 
Through such experiences, it becomes possible for the subject to domesticate troubling 
affects, such as rage, anxiety, or panic. Emotional self-regulation is perhaps the most 
important contribution of attachment in infancy (Stern, 1985). Emotions have definite 
objects, and may be treated as intentional, embodied judgements about the world 
(Nussbaum, 2001) around which the identity of the self is integrated. Emotions provide 
one way of making sense of affects, giving them both meaning and direction (see 
Hollway and Jefferson, 1997) and shaping individuals’ sense of identity but also their 
self-efficacy, the sense of being able to meaningfully influence their environment.  
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The degree to which emotional regulation is possible for an individual shapes how they 
manage relationships with others – through secure attachment, avoidance, ambivalence 
or disorganisation (see e.g. Bretherton, 1992). Through this developmental process, the 
world is constituted for the subject as a more or less ‘secure space’ within which it is 
possible to act in different ways. Between child and world, the secure (or in D.W. 
Winnicott’s terminology, transitional), space is thus a field of emotional possibilities for 
the domestication of affect. It takes on different qualities depending on individuals’ 
characteristic attachment styles (e.g. favouring intimate connection or a tendency to 
withdraw and be alone), with consequences for how identity and self-efficacy are 
patterned. In this sense, it is biographical in a way that marks it as analytically distinct 
from Schatzki’s practice-dependent teleoaffective structures.1 Insecure attachment can 
result in emotional complexes of paralysis and aggression as ways of dealing with 
persistent anxiety. ‘Good enough’ attachment, on the other hand, assures the child that 
experimenting with the world will not destroy either its integrity or that of the self 
(Benjamin, 1990: 46).  
Other extensions of object-relations approaches suggest that the contribution made by 
patterns of attachment to domesticating an intrinsically uncertain future is not limited 
to relationships with caregivers. As the individual passes through childhood and into 
adolescence, then adulthood, attachments and the secure space that emerges around 
them expand to incorporate circles of transitional objects (Young, 1989), which may 
include places (Twigger-Ross and Uzzell, 1996), cultural objects (Lewis, 1969), 
institutions, practices and, ultimately, the ideals and guiding values enshrined in shared 
cultural narratives, and which express interpretations of how connectedness should be 
managed or lived (Marris, 1996). Collections of such objects of attachment extend the 
individual’s secure space to embrace the socio-natural environments s/he inhabits, 
linking the individual to the past and future outlined in cultural narratives through 
which a broader, metaphysical sense of how things should be is made possible 
(Rappaport, 1996). The secure, or transitional space is, in the work of D.W. Winnicott, 
neither fully inside the isolated individual nor located in shared, public space. Instead, it 
is constituted from ambiguous transitional objects that are partially submerged in the 
                                                 
1
 It is also therefore distinct from Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, which designates sets of practical, cognitive 
and emotional dispositions or readinesses-to-act in particular ways that come from ‘training’ individuals in a 
wide range of practices in particular social settings (Lizardo 2004). 
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external world while also protruding into the ‘inside’ of identity and self-efficacy (Jones, 
1991).  
These theoretical insights can be related back to what we might identify as Lucy’s 
secure space. It is evident that her sense of who she is and her feelings of self-efficacy 
are bound up with her relationships to family and friends, and to place, which together 
constitute an emotional and symbolic space in which the unsustainable practice she 
engages in plays a nonetheless identity-sustaining role. In particular, it plays a part in 
helping consolidate the meaning of established relationships in a new context, folding a 
still unsettled everyday life back into her secure space. In this function, we find the 
private and biographically-shaped ‘relational reward’ that the practice offers her. 
 
3.2. ‘It’s always been there’: attachment, insecurity, and the temporal organisation of 
subjectivity 
To understand more precisely what is implied by the constitutive value of participating 
in practices, we now turn to consider more closely the ways in which our data 
illuminates how the connection between practices and attachment helps to domesticate 
an intrinsically uncertain future. A concern with the uncertainty of the future is one that 
is as close to universally human as we can get, and one which is as symbolic and 
emotional in nature as it is also concerned with the affordances of material reality 
(Jackson, 1989: 15–16).  
This function of attachment has already been seen at work in Lucy’s biographical 
transition to her new home. We move now to another, more explicit, example of how 
attachments to practices can help domesticate uncertainty, even while individuals 
undergo transitions that bring insecurity and vulnerability with them. Attachment, as 
we saw in the previous section, contributes to the temporal organisation of subjectivity. 
The anticipations and expectations that are dependent on it allow the subject to deal 
with uncertainties relating to external events. In three interviews Sarah recounts three 
different job transitions in London and links her feelings about employment, in each 
case, to whether her workplace affords her an opportunity to cycle to work. Cycling is 
something that for Sarah has connections to her memories of childhood in Ireland 
before she and her mother moved to London. Her continuing participation in cycling 
now is connected to those memories.  
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So I cycle there and back … when my daughter was young I had a seat on the 
back for her and cycled as much as I could … It’s just quicker to get to work, it’s 
so much quicker … So it was convenience as well and obviously I wanted to try 
and get fit and yes, it just seemed like, they’ve introduced an underground sort of 
cage where you use your pass to get in. So it’s quite a secure bike lock up. So once 
I knew they had that I was more inclined to … And my mum always cycled when I 
was young, I always remember being on the back of her bike in Dublin. So yes, 
and when we lived in the countryside in Ireland, I cycled to school two miles 
each way because there were no buses. So yes, it’s just something that’s always 
been there.  
 
Cycling has practical advantages related to commuting: ‘you know how long it’s going to 
take you … generally speaking and you just feel healthier’. In one sense, then, its value 
derives from the practical ways in which it can reduce uncertainty. Sarah feels its 
deeper value lies, however, in how it connects her to her environment (in particular, to 
her own neighbourhood and to the north London community nearby where her mother 
lives and in which she used to live when they first moved to London), and also in how it 
connects home to workplace. She is particularly conscious of how her previous job 
facilitated this, and how her latest move has undermined it.  
I cycled to Hampstead yeah in my old job which was a lot nicer because you cycle 
through Hampstead Heath but here it’s Central London, it’s Euston, it’s really 
really busy and I’m quite scared about because we don’t have decent cycle lanes 
at all. So just have to be really careful. 
This example demonstrates, again, how attachment to a practice is about more than the 
rewards that engaging in the practice as an object of shared meanings can provide. 
Cycling is accepted by many cyclists (and non-cyclists) to be a more convenient and 
efficient way of getting around in the city than driving. It is also widely seen as a 
sustainable form of transport. But the rewards of cycling for Sarah are connected to 
more private emotional meanings which relate to how she negotiates issues related to 
identity and self-efficacy, along with her ability to manage her time and to navigate her 
environment. These meanings are rooted in an expanded secure space in which her 
work place is tangibly linked to a biographical narrative, at the heart of which is the 
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north London community she enjoyed living in when younger and where her mother 
still lives: it has ‘a village atmosphere and people are friendly’  
 
3.3. ‘It will be a loss’: disrupted practices and broken attachments 
Sarah’s experience of moving jobs has created a situation where the practice of cycling, 
her evaluation of which is shaped by her biographically-conditioned identity and sense 
of self-efficacy, has become difficult for her. This raises questions as to what effect the 
biographical disruption of practices may have on attachment, or vice versa.  
Attachments may motivate recruitment to practices. Practices, in turn, may create 
additional attachments. Changes to the elements of practices may disrupt attachments, 
however, and conversely, disruption of attachments may lead on to defection from 
practices. Practices, Shove et al. (2012: 3) state, are what allow us to ‘go on’ in social life. 
Research on attachment however suggests that, when attachments are displaced or 
broken, it may be the case that we cannot ‘go on’: ‘we no longer know what to do’ 
(Marris, 1996: 3). Damaged attachments may erode both identity and self-efficacy 
(Marris, 1991: 77), effects which may only be overcome through a lengthy re-
integration of the self and a re-evaluation of other attachments and ‘what matters’ to the 
individual in general (Nussbaum, 2001). If attachment helps human beings live with the 
vulnerability to which they are exposed by an inherently uncertain future, then the 
breaking of attachment re-exposes them to this vulnerability.  
A further example from our data that illustrates some aspects of these connections 
between practice, attachment disruption and loss is provided by Ronald, an affluent 
village resident in his seventies. Attachment to driving – and indeed a particular kind of 
driving – appears, for Ronald, to be a central part of his identity, centring on specific 
cars as material objects that bear the traces of ongoing care, particular competences, 
and shared meanings. At the core of his relationship with driving is a kind of autonomy 
connected with the experience of controlled risk, and a sense of comradeship that 
revolves around building, modifying and driving cars. 
I would have no wish to rally in a modern in a modern car, whichever engine it 
was propelled by, no wish at all. It would be quite good fun to drive balls out in 
the most recent Mini, just to see what it was like through a forest, I would enjoy 
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that yes please! … but that would be a novelty; it wouldn't be what turns me on. 
What turns me on is a piece of old kit that you've put together and you've 
developed and, you know, the cars I have are not just reconstructed but I've 
developed them as you would have developed them from original. They are not 
an original but they do stuff that they couldn't do when they were first built. ... 
That's the appeal for me; you've done this, you've put it together, you and your 
chum, its adventure, more than motorsport in a sense … the adventure bit is 
every much as important as the mechanical bit but both are important … so I 
wouldn’t want to do that in a battery-powered car or a hydrogen car or a modern 
car, wouldn’t want to do it and it wouldn’t turn me on. 
Ronald is, however, also very conscious of a variety of issues relating to sustainability, 
and in particular, issues relating to resource and particularly oil depletion. A future 
without plentiful petroleum, where these events may no longer be possible, is one in 
which his identity would be threatened. ‘I feel it will be a loss for certainly my 
generation and probably for the generation behind me. I think it will be a loss’. 
An imagined future in which the material infrastructure on which Ronald’s preferred 
style of driving depends is degraded is one in which he finds it hard to picture a place 
for the competences, ideals and forms of friendship that he identifies as central to his 
identity. Driving may continue thanks to the development of new infrastructures (e.g. 
for electric cars), but not in a way that can support either the shared meanings or 
adventure associated with Ronald’s preferred style of driving, or the personal, internal 
rewards of risk-related autonomy that he finds to be central to participating. The depth 
of the prospective loss he anticipates is underlined both by how he repeats words 
through which he admits a sense of inevitability (‘it will be a loss’), and the way he 
imaginatively extends his perspective to encompass the attachment to leisure driving he 
believes characterises multiple generations of drivers. 
 
3.4. ‘I think we’re all a bit obsessed’: attachment and strategies for dealing with 
uncertainty 
Experiences of attachment loss or even anticipations thereof are, as we have seen, 
experiences of resurgent vulnerability. Such encounters may be dealt with in differing 
ways, depending on biography. More or less intense processes of grieving following 
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attachment loss (Nussbaum, 2001) may be lived and experienced very differently by 
individuals whose emotional relationships are characterised by a secure style of 
attachment, than individuals who manifest an avoidant/dismissive style, or an 
avoidant/fearful one (Worden, 2008: 69–70). Patterns of attachment explored, as in 
previous sections, through narrative interviewing and other elicitation methods 
sensitised, through a psychosocial lens, to the ‘unsaid’, can show how attachment styles 
are mirrored by strategic orientations towards dealing with uncertainty that render it 
liveable, despite the difficulties it brings.  
For example, disconnected styles of attachment developed in relation to painful 
experiences of loss and/or vulnerability may orient the individual towards a defensive 
strategy towards uncertainty, which allows subjects to maintain their identity and self-
efficacy by extracting forms of autonomy from within difficult experiences of 
vulnerability and dependence (Gilligan, 1982). Such strategic orientations are not 
without their own difficulties. At the extreme, defensive strategies may shade into 
withdrawal from attachment (Marris, 1996), mirroring the avoidant/fearful attachment 
styles identified by developmental psychologists.  
Participation in practices may therefore be motivated not just by particular 
attachments, but by particular ‘styles’ of attachment, patterns which develop 
biographically out of experiences of vulnerability. Though we have stressed so far the 
importance of biographical patterns of individual attachment in understanding 
participation in or defection from practices, we have noted that focusing on attachment 
may also provide us with another way of understanding shared aspects of practice. If 
the meaning of practices for individuals is related to their attachments and to the styles 
of attachment they develop over time, it is also connected to shared meanings related to 
styles of attachment (as contrasted with shared meanings of practices), insofar as these 
styles are manifest as shared socio-cultural phenomena. As authors such as Moglen 
(2005) suggest, how vulnerability is dealt with can have effects that extend far beyond 
the emotional life of individuals.  
Fullilove (2004) and Erikson (1995), for example, have documented how disruption to 
attachment and to practice often results from accidents, disasters or large-scale 
intentional social change, e.g. slum clearance. Patterned responses, over time, to 
attachment loss and to vulnerability occasioned through attachment are therefore often 
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not just individual strategies for dealing with uncertainty. They can also, as Marris 
(1996) argues, represent collective strategies for taming an uncertain future, based on 
shared experiences. Here, the internal rewards of practice are not simply idiosyncratic, 
but meet attachment needs experienced by individuals in similar ways within smaller or 
larger groups. One of the side-effects of these strategies, however, is to redistribute 
uncertainty, which may impose additional burdens on some actors and also create 
unintended consequences, some of which may undermine a given strategy itself in the 
longer term (Marris, 1996). The unspoken rewards of practice may therefore include 
particular ways of handling vulnerability which promote culturally-prevalent or 
dominant forms of identity via, for example, assurances of autonomy, invulnerability 
and so on. These rewards may be valued even where the strategies that produce them 
may turn out eventually to be self-undermining (as in the case of valued consumption 
practices that are extremely expensive or environmentally unsustainable, for example).  
An example of how such consequences may emerge from practices that ‘speak to’ 
widely shared experiences of vulnerability is suggested by Lucy, while describing the 
importance of her freezer.  
I think they’re necessary but I think we’re all a bit obsessed, like I think when 
people have two freezers like my mother-in-law has a chest freezer and she 
doesn’t know what half the stuff in there is and I was talking about this with a 
friend and they said they cleared out their grandmother’s freezer once with her 
and there were things that had been in there for like eight years that she’s like 
made and dated … I think it also results in a way of wasting more food because 
you go oh I’ll just shove it in the freezer but actually you never end up using it or 
you end up chucking it out because it’s been in there too long or whatever so. I 
think it’s a necessary thing that we’ve taken, we’ve become a bit over the top 
obsessed with you know.  
The freezer has been described by practice theorists as a ‘time machine’, around which 
are organised a variety of practices (Shove and Southerton, 2000), thanks to the 
appliance’s significance for managing conflicting time pressures (enabling last-minute 
meal preparation for those who work long hours, etc.). In relation to the theme of 
strategically managing uncertainty, this instrumental value of the freezer seems 
relevant. However, Lucy’s example suggests that freezing also has constitutive value in 
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relation to identity, self-efficacy and the secure space of individuals. For example, the 
obsession with freezing is one, Lucy suggests, with accumulating food. This ordinarily 
unsaid value may be read as a way of establishing a feeling of security for the household 
and family through stockpiling.  
The previous generations referenced by Lucy well have known times of hardship and 
scarcity in earlier life. The emotional and symbolic significance of the freezer and 
freezing may then be related to escaping this early biographical phase of identity and its 
negative associations. Lucy’s talk about her freezer implicitly acknowledges the 
practice-theoretical point that the freezer and its material networks enrol individuals in 
particular practices, such as batch cooking with quick meals for young children in mind. 
At the same time, however, the emotional significance of participating in these practices 
relates to identity (‘good enough’ parenting and mothering), associated ideals (plentiful 
food, home-cooking), the vulnerable interiority of the household (food stored against 
contingencies) and even ideals of sustainability (avoiding consumption of heavily 
packaged ready meals, allowing preservation of home-grown food). The ‘obsession’ 
Lucy mentions evokes a strategy of seeking security through particular practices, but 
one which has its own defensive and inherently unsustainable dynamic that itself 
generates uncertainty – in the form of increasing waste and the higher levels of energy 
use necessary to maintain full freezers. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper has responded to practice theory by elaborating a psychosocial approach to 
studying practice change. This approach helps us to understand how attachment (‘why 
things matter to people’, in Sayer’s terms) may influence participation in practices – 
whether these are sustainable (e.g. cycling) or unsustainable (e.g. heating the outdoors). 
The contribution of practices to maintaining biographical and/or socio-culturally 
shared patterns of emotional investment provides relational rewards for individuals 
and groups engaged in particular practices.  
We have thus shown that the meaning of practices is broader but also deeper than is 
typically explicated through many forms of practice theory. By focusing on the links 
between practice and attachment, the rewards of practices can be understood as, in 
part, their contributions to building and rebuilding identities and a secure space in the 
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face of uncertainty. Further, the attraction of individuals to particular practices may be 
shaped by styles or patterns of attachment which evolve in relation to experiences of 
connection but also of vulnerability and loss. Finally, these patterns are not just 
individual. They can express wider patterns of attachment which embody shared 
strategies for dealing with uncertainty that may, in turn, have significant unintended 
consequences. In alerting us to these dimensions of the significance of practice, 
attachment theory does not therefore, as has been claimed, simply depict subjectivity as 
centred upon a constant search for an ‘antidote to fear and anxiety’ (Miller, 2008: 60). 
On the contrary, it helps us understand how different ways of handling attachment 
create specific forms of agency and shape perspectives on what is desirable and 
rational.  
By developing this analytical framework through analysis of the qualitative data 
gathered by the Energy Biographies project, we have shown how it opens up new 
possibilities for exploring the ways in which efforts at changing practices, as part of a 
transition towards sustainability, need to pay heed not just to what practices are 
available and normalised in a community, but also to how participation in these 
practices is affected by individual and shared patterns of attachment. Not only can 
attachment (to place, for example) encourage participation in more sustainable 
practices, as part of an identity. It can also drive participation in practices (like driving 
inefficient cars or heating the outdoors) which are manifestly unsustainable and which 
can exist in tension with other commitments and shared meanings (e.g. Lucy’s views on 
not wasting energy, and her recognition that patio heaters are widely seen as ‘bad’). The 
perspective we have developed here thus deepens, from a policy perspective, critiques 
of ABC approaches to sustainable transitions, by posing the question of how the ‘unsaid’ 
supports the persistence of unsustainable practices. This issue is already recognised by 
some psycho-socially informed approaches to changing individual and community 
practices and attitudes relevant to climate change, such as Carbon Conversations 
(Randall 2009), for example. In this example, individual and group conversations are 
used to ventilate dilemmas and unspoken fears relating to climate change, along with 
how it connects to the ways in which energy is used in everyday life. The goal of these 
interventions is to drive change in practices by confronting their relationship to aspects 
of valued identities that individuals may otherwise find hard to acknowledge. 
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In addition to these implications, two research questions related to sustainable 
transitions and energy practices arise out of our work. On the one hand, the framework 
introduced in this paper opens up the possibility of connecting practice-theoretical 
approaches to psychosocial work relating to lifecourse transitions (McQueen and 
Henwood, 2002), and exploring further the utility of narrative (Henwood and Coltart, 
2012) and linked elicitation and analysis methods (Henwood and Shirani, 2012b) for 
exploring the meaning and structure of these transitions. On the other, the link between 
emotional investments/attachments, identity and shared meanings, identified by 
psychosocial researchers (Hollway and Jefferson, 2005; Jefferson, 1996; Segal, 1990) 
and some sociologists (Marris, 1996), requires further exploration. In particular, 
additional theoretical resources may help us to examine this link in relation to narrative 
biographical data. How are lifecourse transitions themselves socially patterned, and 
how do these patterns ameliorate or exacerbate disruptions to practice and attachment 
in the life of the individual and/or of the group? 
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